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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
____________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
GREGORY J. GILBERT, #11-A-4411,
Petitioner,
       
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 DECISION AND JUDGMENT
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules RJI #16-1-2012-0420.102
INDEX # 2012-913
-against- ORI #NY016015J
BRIAN FISCHER, Commissioner, NYS 
Department of Corrections and Community 
Supervision, and ANDREA EVANS, Chairwoman, 
New York State Board of Parole,
Respondents.
____________________________________________X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Gregory J. Gilbert, verified on October 24, 2012 and received
directly in chambers on October 29, 2012. The petition was filed in the Franklin County
Clerk’s office on November 1, 2012.  Petitioner, who is an inmate at the Bare Hill
Correctional Facility, is challenging the November 2011 determination denying him parole
and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months.  The Court issued an Order to
Show Cause on October 30, 2012 and has received and reviewed respondents’ Answer,
including Confidential Exhibit’s B and D, verified on December 20, 2012.  No Reply
thereto has been received from petitioner.
On September 26, 2011 petitioner was sentenced in St. Lawrence County Court to
a controlling indeterminate sentence of 1a to 4 years upon his convictions of two counts
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of the crime of Criminal Contempt 1°.   Petitioner made his initial appearance before a1
Parole Board on November 29, 2011.  The Court notes that with a controlling minimum
period of imprisonment of 1a years and 386 days of jail time credit, petitioner’s initial
Parole Board appearance occurred less than two months after he was received into
DOCCS custody.  Following petitioner’s initial appearance a decision was rendered
denying him discretionary release and directing that he be held for an additional 24
months.  The parole denial determination reads as follows:
“AFTER A CAREFUL REVIEW OF THE RECORD AND INTERVIEW, THE
PANEL HAS DETERMINED THAT IF RELEASED AT THIS TIME, THERE
IS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD NOT LIVE AND
REMAIN AT LIBERTY WITHOUT AGAIN VIOLATING THE LAW AND
YOUR RELEASE WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE WELFARE OF
SOCIETY.
  
THIS DECISION IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING FACTORS: YOUR
INSTANT OFFENSE IS TWO COUNTS OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT 1ST
FOR WHICH YOU ARE SERVING 1a - 4 YEARS.  THIS CRIME IS THE
CONTINUATION OF A CRIMINAL HISTORY WHICH INCLUDES PRIOR
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT 2  CONVICTIONS.  YOU HAVE BEENND
UNDETERRED BY PRIOR COURT INTERVENTIONS AND HAVE DONE
POORLY IN THE PAST UNDER COMMUNITY SUPERVISION.
THE BOARD NOTES YOUR LETTERS OF SUPPORT AND GOOD
DISCIPLINE WHILE IN PRISON. 
 
ALL FACTORS CONSIDERED, YOUR RELEASE AT THIS TIME IS NOT
WARRANTED.”
  Identical indeterminate sentences of 1a  to 4 years were imposed in connection with each count. 1
The two counts arose from criminal conduct occurring on two different days and were set forth in separate
indictments (2011-124 and 2011-125).  The sentence and commitment order associated with the count set
forth in indictment #2011-124 indicated that the indeterminate sentence of 1a  to 4 years was to run
concurrently with respect to the sentence imposed in connection with indictment #2011-125.  The sentence
and commitment order associated with the count set forth in indictment 2011-125, however, indicated that
the indeterminate sentence of 1a  to 4 years was to run consecutively with respect to the sentence imposed
in connection with indictment #2011-124.  In any event, DOCCS officials have apparently calculated
petitioner’s sentences as running concurrently with respect to each other.
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The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeal from the parole denial
determination was received by the DOCCS Parole Appeals Unit on April 25, 2012. 
Although the Appeals Unit failed to issue its findings and recommendation within the 4-
month time frame set forth in 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c), a belated decision on administrative
appeal was, in fact, issued on or about November 5, 2012, after this proceeding had been
commenced.
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C , subpart A,
§§38-f and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011, provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after
considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and
that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not
so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the
law.  In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted
pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this
article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional
record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy
and interactions with staff and inmates . . . (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support
services available to the inmate . . . (vii) the seriousness of the offense with
due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and
recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney
for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as consideration of
any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior
to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and
pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement . . .”
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259-
i(5) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety.  See Silmon
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908, Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d
3 of 8 
[* 3]
614 and Coombs v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1051.  Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements.  See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York State
Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
In this proceeding petitioner argues, in effect, that the Parole Board improperly
based its denial determination upon the nature of the crimes underlying his
incarceration/prior criminal record  and, in the process, failed to adequately consider2
other mandatory statutory factors such as his institutional programing/disciplinary
records and his release plans.  A Parole Board, however, need not assign equal weight to
each statutory factor it is required to consider in connection with a discretionary parole
determination, nor is it required to expressly discuss each of those factors in its written
decision.  See Martin v. New York State Division of Parole, 47 AD3d 1152, Porter v.
Dennison, 33 AD3d 1147 and Baez v. Dennison, 25 AD3d 1052, lv den 6 NY3d 713.  As
noted by the Appellate Division, Third Department, the role of a court reviewing a parole
denial determination “. . . is not to assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the
relevant factors, but only whether the Board followed the statutory guidelines and
rendered a determination that is supported, and not contradicted, by the facts in the
record.  Nor could we effectively review the Board’s weighing process, given that it is not
 On page four of the petition the petitioner references his criminal history as “non existing.”  To the2
extent such reference might be construed as an assertion that the Parole Board relied upon erroneous
information with respect to petitioner’s prior criminal record, the Court notes that its review of  the Inmate
Status Report prepared in an anticipation of petitioner’s November 29, 2011 Parole Board appearance
(Exhibit C annexed to respondents’ Answer) reveals petitioner was twice convicted of the crime of Criminal
Contempt 2° following arrests in August of 2007 and April of 2008.  In addition, during the course of the
November 29, 2011 Parole Board appearance, the following statement was directed to petitioner by a Parole
Commissioner: “You have two prior Criminal Contempt 2  degrees, you were under probation.  It wasnd
revoked at one point and it seems like almost all of your troubles stem from the same type of thing, right?” 
Rather than denying the prior convictions petitioner simply responded “[i]t’s the same person, yes.”
4 of 8 
[* 4]
required to state each factor that it considers, weigh each factor equally or grant parole
as a reward for exemplary institutional behavior.”  Comfort v. New York State Division
of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295, 1296 (citations omitted). 
In the case at bar,  reviews of the Inmate  Status Report and transcript of the
November 29, 2011 Parole Board appearance reveal that the Board had before it
information with respect to the appropriate statutory factors including petitioner’s
therapeutic programming record, clean disciplinary record and release plans, in addition
to the circumstances of the crimes underlying his current incarceration and his prior
criminal record.  See Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828.   
During the course of the November 29, 2011 Parole Board appearance there was
little, if any, discussion with respect to the specific circumstances of the crimes underlying
petitioner’s incarceration.  After noting that petitioner was incarcerated for two counts of
the crime of Criminal Contempt 1° and that he was serving concurrent sentences of 1a to
4 years, a Parole commissioner asked petitioner if there was anything he would like to say
regarding the offenses.  Petitioner responded with an extended discussion of his troubled
nine-year relationship with the mother of his children, but provided no details with
respect to the specific events leading to his convictions.  Other than posing one question
with respect to petitioner’s prior criminal record (see footnote #2), the only other
discussions initiated by the Parole commissioners were with respect to letters of support
from petitioner’s mother and a neighbor, petitioner’s  therapeutic programing history, his
clean disciplinary record and release plans.   The Court, moreover, finds nothing in the
hearing transcript to suggest that the Board cut short petitioner’s discussion of any
relevant factor or otherwise prevented him from expressing clear and complete responses
to its inquiries. 
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In view of the above, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the Parole Board
failed to consider the relevant statutory factors.  See McAllister v. New York State
Division of Parole 78 AD3d 1413, lv den 16 NY3d 707, and Davis v. Lemons, 73 AD3d
1354.   Since the requisite statutory factors were considered, and given the narrow scope
of judicial review of discretionary parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis
to conclude that the denial determination in this case was affected by irrationality
bordering on impropriety as a result of the emphasis placed by the Board on the nature
of the crimes underlying petitioner’s incarceration as well as his prior criminal record. 
See Allis v. New York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1309.
Before concluding the Court must also address petitioner’s concerns with respect
to the recent amendment to Executive Law §259-c(4).  That statute, as amended by L
2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, §38-b, effective September 30, 2011 , provides that the3
New York State Board of Parole shall “ . . .establish written procedures for its use in
making parole decisions as required by law.  Such written procedures shall incorporate
risk and needs principles to measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the
board, the likelihood of success of such persons upon release, and assist members of the
state board of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole
supervision . . .”  (Emphasis added).  To the extent petitioner argues that the amended
version of Executive Law §259-c(4) “ . . . mandates that the Board of Parole cannot use the
past criminal history or the current penal law offense to arrive at a conclusion for denying
parole,” the Court rejects such argument.  Notwithstanding the amendment to Executive
Law §259-c(4), a Parole Board considering an inmate for discretionary parole release
 L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, section 49(f) provides that “. . . the amendments to subdivision3
4 of section 259-c of the executive law made by section thirty-eight-b of this act shall take effect six months
after it shall have become a law . . .”  Since the underlying legislation was enacted on March 31, 2011, the
amendment to Executive Law §259-c(4) became effective as of September 30, 2011 (or October 1, 2011).
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remains statutorily mandated to consider, among other factors, the seriousness of the
offense(s) underlying such inmate’s incarceration as well as his/her prior criminal record. 
See Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A)(vii) and (viii).  Although the list of statutory factors to
be considered by a Parole Board in connection with a discretionary parole release
consideration (Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A)) was not changed by reason of the
amendment to Executive Law §259-c(4), the amendment does require that the Parole
Board’s determination be rendered within a framework of “ . . . written procedures [that]
shall incorporate risk and needs principals to measure the rehabilitation of persons
appearing before the board . . .[and] the likelihood of success of such persons upon
release . . .”  Executive Law §259-c(4).
This Court has serious reservations with respect to the issue of whether the
October 5, 2011 memorandum of respondent Evans (a copy which is annexed to
respondents’ answer as Exhibit L) lawfully constitutes the “written procedures” referenced
in the amended version of Executive Law §259-c(4).  Notwithstanding such reservations,
and in view of the unique circumstances of this case, as detailed below, the Court declines
to reach the issue of respondents’ compliance with the provisions of Executive Law §259-
c(4) at this time.  In this regard the Court again notes that petitioner was in DOCCS
custody for less than two months prior to his November 29, 2011 Parole Board
appearance.  More importantly, the Court’s review of Confidential Exhibit B (the pre-
sentence investigation report prepared by the St. Lawrence County Department of
Probation) indicates that a COMPAS (Correctional Offender Management Profiling for
Alternative Sanctions) assessment, which constitutes a risk and needs assessment
instrument, was prepared with respect to the petitioner approximately four months prior
to the November 29, 2011 Parole Board appearance.  The COMPAS assessment apparently
revealed that petitioner represented a “moderate to high risk for reoffense.”
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Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.
Dated: April 1, 2013 at 
Indian Lake, New York.        __________________________
                                                                                        S. Peter Feldstein
   Acting Supreme Court Justice
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